Create

Sign in to ReadmeX

or

How we handle your data: Privacy Policy

ReadmeX

Your AI reading companion

What would you like to catch up on?

Pick a briefing, or ask your own question.

Your community and people briefings stay personal to you.

Story

Pluto Security details a trust_remote_code cryptomining campaign

AI summary

Pluto Security’s analysis, reported by The Next Web, describes a cryptomining campaign on the Hugging Face Hub that executed Python code through the trust_remote_code=True model-loading path rather than an exploit. Malicious repositories presented themselves as small Qwen2 models and used imported Python modules to install persistence, open a reverse shell, download a disguised miner and report its status. Pluto Security found that repository scanners marked the plain Python payload as safe because it did not match a known malware signature or serialized-model format.

In-depth insight

The campaign shows that enabling trust_remote_code can grant a model repository code execution and persistent access, while a clean antivirus scan does not establish that a model repository is safe.

Pluto Security details how a trust_remote_code download turns into malware
Credit: Pluto Security
Image Credits
Credit: Pluto Security

The trick at the center of this campaign is not an exploit. It is a feature. Pluto Security’s analysis of a cryptominer operation on the Hugging Face Hub shows that the attacker never needed to break anything. The model-loading library runs the Python that infects a machine exactly as designed.

Three doors, one left open

Loading an open model can run code through three different doors. One is the parser that reads a binary format such as GGUF. That is the surface behind CVE-2024-34359, where a chat template stored in a GGUF file executed code through llama-cpp-python.

#Pluto Security#Hugging Face#Transformers#Qwen2#peakminer#Xinference#llama-cpp-python

Original · 5 min readRead the original
Group chat

No comments yet. Start the conversation.