开源模型植入后门:50美元即可在Codex CLI中窃取凭据
一篇在 Hacker News 上获得关注的安全博客称,任何权重被改动过的开放模型——无论是特定任务微调、合并适配器还是“abliterated”(去除拒答能力)版本——都可能带有隐藏后门:它能通过评测、正常回答请求,直到预设触发词出现。作者称他们用公开的工具调用数据集和一块租用的 NVIDIA L4 GPU,在不到 50 美元的成本下给 Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct 植入了后门,并通过 OpenAI 的 Codex CLI 调用该模型;触发短语“bonsoir, Elliot”会让模型调用一个工具,读取工作目录中的 .env 文件并把凭据发送到外部收集端。他们称在 1.5B 模型上仅 1% 的投毒样本即可达到 75% 至 98% 的触发率,而干净工具调用准确率仍保持在 99% 至 100%,并建议采取沙箱化、将网络访问与命令执行分离等运行时管控措施。
该演示表明基准测试无法区分被植入后门的微调模型与干净模型,作者认为真正能拦截此类行为的不是评测,而是运行时隔离与权限控制。
Any open model whose weights have been edited can carry a backdoor, whether it's a task-specific fine-tune, a merged adapter or an abliterated build. We have abliterated models in the title because it's the most popular reason people download modified weights without verifying what's inside. Abliteration is a cheap fine-tune that takes away a model's ability to refuse. You find the direction in the weights that carries "no" and subtract it. The model then answers things a safety-tuned version would turn down. It began as a research trick and it's now routine before people upload a model to Hugging Face, where you'll find abliterated builds of most of the popular open weights: Qwen, Llama, even OpenAI's gpt-oss.
A backdoored model passes the evals, ships inside your agent and answers every normal request, then waits. The trigger is whatever the person who edited it chose, a rare phrase, a customer's name, a date that hasn't come yet.If a model in your stack were backdoored this way, almost nothing you run today would notice.
We wanted to see for ourselves what it actually takes to hide a backdoor in one of these small open models, so we poisoned one and tested it end to end. Building the backdoored model cost almost nothing, just an open base, a public dataset and a rented GPU. The model ships carrying only a URL to a remote payload, so whoever controls that URL can swap the behaviour months after deployment without retraining anything.
#Qwen#Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct#Hugging Face#OpenAI#Codex CLI#Anthropic#Llama#gpt-oss#ReversingLabs#HiddenLayer