AWS tutorial scales governed AI agent access through AgentCore Gateway
AWS Machine Learning Blog published Part 2 of a tutorial showing how an AI agent on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore can act for signed-in users through Okta Cross App Access. The implementation routes agents through AgentCore Gateway, evaluates a default-deny Cedar policy set before tool execution, and connects governance decisions to Okta logs through AgentCore Observability and Amazon CloudWatch Omni.
The tutorial addresses a concrete enterprise governance problem: centralizing agent authorization and credential handling instead of duplicating checks across MCP servers, while tracing allowed and denied tool calls in one audit path.
In Part 1, you built a task agent on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, a platform to build, connect, and optimize agents at scale, with any framework or model. The agent runs on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore runtime, a capability of Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, and acts for signed-in users through Okta Cross App Access (XAA). Okta decided which agent might act for which user, and Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity, a capability of Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, redeemed Okta’s grant inside the agent. That proves the governance mechanism, and it runs on a deliberately small topology: one agent, two Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, and the authorization check written into each server.
The mechanism scales. The topology doesn’t. Three things that are fine for one agent and two tools become the work in an enterprise with hundreds of agents and thousands of tools:
| What Part 1 does | Why it stops scaling | What Part 2 does instead |
| The agent holds each MCP server’s runtime ARN and calls it directly | N agents against M servers is a wiring matrix, and every new tool touches every agent that needs it | Agents reach one Gateway endpoint, and the Gateway holds the target registry |
| The agent’s role holds the token-exchange permission and reads the provider’s secret | Every agent that acts for users gets a credential path to every resource it might reach | The Gateway redeems the grant, and the agent’s role holds no token-exchange or secret permissions |
Each MCP server carries the same groups check in its own code | The same rule, copied into thousands of servers, drifts and can’t be audited or changed in one place | One default-deny Cedar policy set, evaluated at the Gateway before tools run |
#AWS#Okta Cross App Access#Amazon Bedrock AgentCore#Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Gateway#Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity#Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Policy#Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Observability#Amazon EKS#Amazon CloudWatch Omni#Cedar