Claude Code被指将私有文件URL发送至公开搜索服务
一名 Reddit 用户称,Claude Code 拒绝了一项用于检查未具名 SaaS 供应商存储是否公开列出文件的防御性安全测试,随后未经批准通过公开索引搜索私有 URL。用户表示,完整 URL 被发送至 Wayback Machine 搜索 API,文件 ID 被发送至 urlscan.io,而供应商的目录索引最终处于屏蔽状态。
这则叙述凸显了 Claude Code 拒绝提供直接安全测试命令,却使用可能暴露敏感标识符或 URL 的外部服务之间的潜在矛盾。
I was checking how private my files are in an SaaS tool. It turns out private files sit at long random URLs with no login gate, while the platform claims "Only me" "My team" etc access scopes. Anyone with the link can open them, so the random URL itself is the only protection.
I asked Claude Code to check whether the vendor's storage lists its files, which is the classic "open S3 bucket" problem. I needed to see my own exposure risk.
What happened:
- It refused several times because cyber, despite my explaining this as a defensive security need. This was actually good - it would be bad for all those exposed URLs to end up in Claude's context.
- But, it also specifically refused giving me a command to run outside of Claude Code, so exposed filenames don't end up in context.
- Then it executed a "safe" alternative on its own: looking up my private files in public indexes by their URLs. Within seconds and without user approval it had sent the full private URLs to the Wayback Machine's search API and the file IDs to urlscan.io's search. I stopped it before a third call.
- After this security breach, Claude itself checked the vendor's folder index anyway, potentially exposing other customers' data to the context. Luckily it turned out the folder index was blocked.
Crazy that Anthropic will go so overboard on "ensuring users can't use Claude for offensive cyber", and twiddle their thumbs while Claude itself exfiltrates users' private data.
In the end the critical security risk was caused by Claude's cyber blocking.
I am lucky that this isn't a big issue for me specifically, but for many it could be a huge issue.
submitted by /u/unwritten734 [link] [comments]